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&
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When Machines Are Watching: How Warrantless Use
of GPS Surveillance Technology Violates the Fourth
Amendment Right Against Unreasonable Searches
introduction
Federal and state law enforcement officials throughout the nation are
currently using Global Positioning System (GPS) technology for automated,
prolonged surveillance without obtaining warrants. As a result, cases are
proliferating in which criminal defendants are challenging law enforcement’s
warrantless uses of GPS surveillance technology, and courts are looking for
direction from the Supreme Court. Most recently, a split has emerged between
the Ninth and D.C. Circuit Courts of Appeal on the issue. In United States v.
Pineda-Moreno,1 the Ninth Circuit relied on United States v. Knotts2—which
approved the limited use of beeper technology without a warrant—to uphold
warrantless use of GPS surveillance technology.3 However, in United States v.
Maynard,4 the D.C. Circuit held that warrants are required for law enforcement
use of GPS tracking devices. In distinguishing Knotts, the D.C. Circuit pointed
to the vast differences between the relatively primitive beeper technology used
almost thirty years ago and the unprecedented power of GPS surveillance

1.
2.
3.
4.

United States v. Pineda-Moreno (Pineda-Moreno I), 591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir.), reh’g en banc
denied, 617 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2010).
460 U.S. 276 (1983).
591 F.3d at 1216-17.
615 F.3d 544, 557 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. granted sub nom. United States v. Jones, 131 S. Ct.
3064 (2011) (No. 10-1259).
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technology used today.5 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals6 and various
state courts7 are similarly divided. In light of this confusion, the Supreme
Court has recently agreed to review the issue, granting certiorari from the
decision of the D.C. Circuit in Maynard8 and leaving the Pineda-Moreno
petition in a holding pattern. On November 8, the Supreme Court will hold
oral arguments in the case, which was docketed under the new name United
States v. Jones.9
The Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment doctrine, including its cases
evaluating new surveillance technologies, has always been informed by one of
the Amendment’s animating principles: its mandate to prevent abuse of police

5.

6.

7.

8.
9.

See id. at 556-58; see also United States v. Pineda-Moreno (Pineda-Moreno II), 617 F.3d 1120,
1126 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (arguing
that the warrant requirement must apply to GPS surveillance because GPS technology
allows unprecedented intrusions into privacy).
United States v. Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d 272 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding that no warrant was
needed to track a suspect for sixty hours). But see id. at 286 (Wood, J., dissenting) (adopting
the reasoning of the D.C. Circuit in Maynard); cf. United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 998
(7th Cir. 2007) (acknowledging in dicta that “[t]echnological progress poses a threat to
privacy by enabling an extent of surveillance that in earlier times would have been
prohibitively expensive” and expressing relief that the court did not have to decide the
question in that case); id. at 997-98 (“[T]here is a difference . . . [between using the new
technologies] on the one hand and following suspects around in a car on the other. The new
technologies enable, as the old (because of expense) do not, wholesale surveillance.”).
High courts in three states—Massachusetts, New York, and Washington—have held that
warrants are required for the use of GPS surveillance under the state’s constitution.
Commonwealth v. Connolly, 913 N.E.2d 356, 366-67 (Mass. 2009); People v. Weaver, 909
N.E.2d 1195, 1201-03 (N.Y. 2009); State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217, 264 (Wash. 2003) (en
banc). On the other hand, three state intermediate appellate courts—in Maryland, Virginia,
and Wisconsin—have held that a warrant is not required for the use of GPS surveillance.
Stone v. State, 941 A.2d 1238, 1250-51 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2008) (holding that “the
appellant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his location . . . in a vehicle
riding on public roads, and therefore evidence about the use of the GPS device . . . was not
relevant to the appellant’s Fourth Amendment-based suppression motion”); Foltz v.
Commonwealth, 698 S.E.2d 281, 291 n.12 (Va. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that no warrant is
required for the use of GPS surveillance for under six days), aff’d on re’h en banc, 706 S.E.2d
914 (Va. Ct. App. 2011); State v. Sveum, 769 N.W.2d 53, 60 (Wis. Ct. App. 2009) (holding
that no warrant is required for the use of GPS technology in law enforcement surveillance as
long as the device is attached while the vehicle is parked in a public place), aff’d on other
grounds, 787 N.W.2d 317 (Wis. 2010).
Jones, 131 S. Ct. at 3064.
Preview of United States Supreme Court Cases: United States v. Jones, AM. BAR ASS’N,
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/preview_home/10-1259.html (last visited Oct. 11,
2011).
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power.10 While the Court has not always articulated this theory of the Fourth
Amendment as clearly as it could have, a careful review of the case law reveals a
concern about abuse and “a too permeating police surveillance.”11 This reading
demands that, in any review of new surveillance technology, courts must
evaluate the technology’s potential for abuse.12
Unfortunately, in drawing lines between technology such as powerful
binoculars that merely enhance the senses of law enforcement officials and
technology such as thermal imaging devices that create new superhuman
powers, the Justices have offered confusing guidance to lower courts. At times,
they have relied on a distinction between sense enhancement and sense
creation, a superficial distinction that fails to delineate when new surveillance
technology is problematic.13 At other times, the Court has reverted to language
reminiscent of past Fourth Amendment doctrine requiring some sort of
physical trespass in order to trigger the warrant requirement. The Court
rejected that doctrine in Katz v. United States,14 when it recognized that new
technologies make a private space/public space line unworkable. However, the

10.

11.
12.

13.

14.

For an interpretation of the Fourth Amendment that emphasizes its function as a check on
executive power, see Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Founders’ Privacy: The Fourth Amendment
and the Power of Technological Surveillance, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1325 (2002). Ku marshals
historical evidence from the seventeenth century to support the claim that “the Fourth
Amendment was adopted as a means of restraining official discretion.” Id. at 1334. As
discussed below, this structural theory of the Fourth Amendment may offer more robust
support for the defendants’ claims in Jones and Pineda-Moreno than a notion of the Fourth
Amendment focused primarily on personal privacy. See discussion infra Part I.
United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948).
As Daniel Solove notes, outright abuse is not the only threat posed by government
information gathering: “even if government entities are not attempting to engage in social
control, their activities can have collateral effects that harm democracy and selfdetermination.” Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment
Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1101-02 (2002). The government’s capacity to monitor the
movements of millions of individuals without a warrant may produce pernicious chilling
effects even if the government never exercises this capacity. Cf. id. at 1107 (“[O]ne need not
fear the rise of a totalitarian state or the inhibition of democratic activities to desire strong
controls on the power of the government in collecting personal information.”). Hence this
Essay focuses on the potential for abuse, which insulates our argument from the claim that
“[l]aw enforcement has not abused GPS technology” and that “[n]o evidence exists of
widespread, suspicionless GPS monitoring.” Brief for the United States at 14, United
States v. Jones, No. 10-1259 (U.S. Aug. 11, 2011), available at http://volokh.com/wp/
wp-content/uploads/2011/08/DOJJonesBrief.pdf. But see infra Section II.C (suggesting
evidence of abuse).
See generally David E. Steinberg, Making Sense of Sense-Enhanced Searches, 74 MINN. L. REV.
563 (1990) (analyzing the case law of sense-enhanced searches and arguing that the Fourth
Amendment can effectively regulate such searches).
389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967).
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Justices’ failure to explain clearly the source of their concerns about new
technology, coupled with their haphazard use of language, has confused the
lower courts and commentators. This confusion has led some to conclude that
the use of GPS surveillance technology for prolonged, automated surveillance
of targets should not be considered a “search” subject to the Fourth
Amendment, at least to the extent that the surveillance occurs on public streets.
As we argue in this Essay, the use of GPS surveillance for prolonged
monitoring without a warrant cannot pass muster under the Fourth
Amendment. It may seem at first glance that GPS tracking of public actions—
actions that the police can otherwise follow without a warrant in the status
quo—is harmless from a privacy perspective. After all, if cops can tail a suspect
for days or weeks without a warrant, what difference does it make if the
tracking is done by an undercover officer or a GPS device under the hood of a
suspect’s car? However, when “machines are watching”—that is, when
tracking is automated and extended for prolonged periods of time—the
potential for abuse grows larger. In such circumstances, the warrant
requirement, with its limited exceptions, provides a necessary check on
overreach by law enforcement authorities.
This Essay is organized in three Parts. In Part I, we outline the Fourth
Amendment’s structural protections against law enforcement abuse and
explain the Court’s historic approach to new surveillance technologies. While
the Court’s approach is undertheorized, we show that the Court has carefully
examined new technologies to prevent technological end-runs around existing
legal doctrine that seeks to protect personal privacy. We maintain that the
Court’s doctrinal distinction between sense-enhancing and sense-creating
technology is effectively a proxy for the Court’s underlying interest in
protecting against governmental abuse.15 In Part II, we explain why GPS
surveillance technology creates unprecedented potential for abuse, and we
present anecdotal evidence suggesting that abuse of GPS surveillance
technology may be occurring already. Note, though, that our argument does
not hinge on the claim that abuse is widespread. Rather, we argue that GPS
surveillance poses a real threat, even if (and we have no way of knowing
whether this is true) the potential for abuse has not yet been realized except in
a limited number of cases. Our conception of the Fourth Amendment differs

15.

180

Other scholars have noted the importance this distinction has played in Fourth Amendment
cases. See, e.g., Renée McDonald Hutchins, Tied Up in Knotts? GPS Technology and the
Fourth Amendment, 55 UCLA L. REV. 409, 432 (2007) (“[T]he Court has, in large part, tied
the scope of Fourth Amendment protection to the categorization of a technology as either
sense augmenting or extrasensory.”). However, none have connected the distinction to the
Court’s broad theory of the Fourth Amendment as protecting against governmental abuse.

when machines are watching

fundamentally from the Solicitor General’s view, expressed in the
government’s brief in Jones, that “[t]he decision whether to apply different
constitutional principles to hypothetical programs of mass, suspicionless
surveillance can await resolution if such programs ever occur.”16 We do not
believe that the Court must stand aside until “Big Brother” arrives; doing so
would render the Fourth Amendment’s protections a “dead letter.”17
In Part III, we connect our interpretation of the Fourth Amendment to the
“reasonable expectation of privacy” language that looms large in contemporary
case law. In our view, a “reasonable expectation of privacy” may be violated
even if individuals already anticipate that the information at issue can be
accessed by law enforcement officials. Indeed, any other interpretation of that
language would yield perverse implications: if “hypothetical programs of mass,
suspicionless surveillance” ever arrived, individuals would then have no
expectation of privacy once they learned of the surveillance, and the
“expectation of privacy” protection—if interpreted literally—would become a
nullity.
Our interpretation of the Fourth Amendment is consistent with the
concerns underlying past Supreme Court decisions. As Part III explains,
control over information about our location is still central to our sense of self.
This interpretation of the Fourth Amendment and the individual rights
interpretation ultimately converge in GPS cases, and both views counsel in
favor of the conclusion that the use of this technology for automated,
prolonged surveillance should be subject to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant
requirement.
i. the fourth amendment and technological a dvance s
Most legal commentary on the Fourth Amendment implications of GPS
surveillance technology has bypassed the core, structural Fourth Amendment
issue. For example, Orin Kerr has distinguished between “public location
information obtained from GPS devices” and “private facts” that fall within the
ambit of the Fourth Amendment’s protections.18 In this Essay, we argue that

16.
17.

18.

Brief for the United States, supra note 12, at 35.
Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 865 n.6 (2006); see id. (“If high crime rates were
grounds enough for disposing of Fourth Amendment protections, the Amendment long ago
would have become a dead letter.”).
For Kerr’s perspective on GPS surveillance specifically, see Orin Kerr, Does the
Fourth Amendment Prohibit Warrantless GPS Surveillance?, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Dec.
13, 2009, 9:46 PM), http://volokh.com/2009/12/13/does-the-fourth-amendment-prohibit
-warrantless-gps-surveillance [hereinafter Kerr, GPS Surveillance], in which Kerr argues
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the scholarly focus on the information collected by new technology19 gives
short shrift to the animating and long-honored principle of the Fourth
Amendment: protection of the populace from abuse of law enforcement
powers. This fundamental principle underlies the Court’s decisions evaluating
the application of the Fourth Amendment to the use of new surveillance
technologies, including its recent decision requiring a warrant for thermal
imaging in Kyllo v. United States.20 In cases from Katz to Knotts to Kyllo,
wherever a new technology carries the potential for police abuse, the Court has
allowed its use only as guarded by the warrant requirement, placing a check on
the unlimited discretion otherwise afforded officers. As the Supreme Court has
acknowledged, “[r]equiring a warrant will have the salutary effect of ensuring
that use of [new technology] is not abused.”21
Given the Court’s command to examine the reasonableness of an
expectation of privacy in determining whether a search has occurred,22 it is
perhaps not surprising that commentators have focused on the nature of the
information collected. And we do not mean to say that the nature of the
information collected by a technology is irrelevant. If a technology only had the
capacity to collect, store, and analyze data in which individuals had no privacy
or dignitary interest—such as the information individuals make available to the
public in phone books—then neither the abuse of that technology nor the
potential for abuse would be of such grave concern. However, as the Court has
repeatedly recognized, the means of surveillance, the nature of the technology at
issue, and its potential for abuse must be considered as well.23 Considering
these three factors will impact the Court’s analysis of privacy expectations, as

19.

20.
21.
22.
23.

182

that a warrant is not required for GPS surveillance because there is no privacy interest in
public whereabouts. On the “private facts” model more broadly, see Orin S. Kerr, Four
Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV. 503, 506 (2007) [hereinafter Kerr,
Four Models].
Hutchins, for example, recognizes the Court’s distinction between sense-augmenting and
“extrasensory” technologies, see Hutchins, supra note 15, at 436, but argues that this
distinction is superficial and that the key inquiry lies in the information obtained by the
technology, id. at 437-38. See also Kerr, GPS Surveillance, supra note 18 (arguing that “the key
question is the nature of the information collected instead of the details of the technology
used to collect it”).
533 U.S. 27 (2001).
United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 717 (1984).
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37-39; Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 606-07 (1977) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (asserting that the Fourth Amendment limits not only “the type of information
the State may gather but also . . . the means it may use to gather it”); Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) (“The overriding function of the Fourth Amendment is
to protect personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the State.”).
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we outline in Part III below. We start, however, with an examination of how
the Court has treated the potential for law enforcement abuse of surveillance
methods in the past.
A. The Fourth Amendment’s Emphasis on Law Enforcement Abuse
As has been thoroughly documented, the Founders designed the Fourth
Amendment to protect citizens against arbitrary police invasions,24 a direct
response to unwarranted searches and seizures by British officers targeting
political opponents both in England and in the colonies.25 As the Court
cautioned more than eighty years ago, “[t]he Fourth Amendment was adopted
in view of long misuse of power in the matter of searches and seizures both in
England and the colonies.”26 The Court sees the Amendment playing a robust
role as our primary protection against “a too permeating police surveillance.”27
And it is the warrant requirement that is the Court’s means of enforcing this
protection.28
In addition to protecting personal space from invasion, thereby protecting
our homes as our castles, the Fourth Amendment also serves a crucial function
in preserving an open democratic process and in ensuring the equal treatment
of citizens.29 It stops police from using surveillance to intimidate targeted
groups of citizens and prevent their free and equal participation in political
organization and discussion.30 Moreover, the Fourth Amendment’s protections
reflect the view that certain individuals are more at risk than others when they
gather to discuss politics, transact business, or even seek medical care.31 To

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

29.

30.

31.

See Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967).
See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583 & n.21 (1980).
Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 33-34 (1927).
United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948).
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 362 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“As elsewhere
under the Fourth Amendment, warrants are the general rule, to which the legitimate needs
of law enforcement may demand specific exceptions.”).
See generally Solove, supra note 12, at 1122 (“[T]he Fourth Amendment provides for an
architecture of power, a structure of protection that safeguards a range of different social
practices of which privacy forms an integral dimension.”).
See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225 (1973) (recognizing that “the
possibility of unfair and even brutal police tactics poses a real and serious threat to civilized
notions of justice”).
See generally Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 531 U.S. 67, 70-73 (2001) (describing a policy
developed by a public hospital in collusion with police and prosecutors to test for drugs in
pregnant women in the public hospital but not in private hospitals).
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protect against abuse of “discretion,” the Fourth Amendment requires that “the
usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence . . . be drawn by a
neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged
in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.”32 The Court itself
has indicated that the warrant requirement and the exclusionary rule are the
only effective limitations on lawless searches and seizures.33
B. New Technologies and the Fourth Amendment
When examining the use of new surveillance technologies, the Court has
recognized that old Fourth Amendment legal standards may not provide
enough protection because a new technology can create powers of surveillance
that were not anticipated when old legal standards were developed. The Court
therefore discourages the “mechanical” application of doctrinal standards that
allow end-runs around Fourth Amendment protections and leave us “at the
mercy of advancing technology.”34 Instead, the Court encourages the adoption
of rules that “take account of more sophisticated systems that are already in use
or in development.”35 Any standard applied must meet the broader structural
concerns of the Fourth Amendment and “assure[ the] preservation of that
degree of privacy against government that existed when the Fourth
Amendment was adopted.”36
In its decisions examining whether law enforcement use of a new
surveillance method should be allowed without the minimal limitations of a
warrant, the Court has not hesitated to modify its Fourth Amendment inquiry
as necessary to ensure that the purpose underlying the Amendment is carried
forward. For example, in Katz,37 the Court evaluated law enforcement’s use of a
novel listening device, one that attached to the outside of phone booths but
nevertheless allowed police officers to eavesdrop on a target’s phone
conversations. This method met the technical requirements of Fourth

32.

Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 n.24 (1980) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333
U.S. 10, 14 (1948)).

33.

See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 220 (1960) (“[N]either administrative, criminal
nor civil remedies are effective in suppressing lawless searches and seizures.” (citing People
v. Cahan, 282 P.2d 905, 913 (Cal. 1955))). But see Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First
Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 812-16 (1994) (arguing that revitalized civil remedies
would be sufficient to control police abuse).
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 35 (2001).

34.
35.
36.
37.

184

Id. at 36.
Id. at 34.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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Amendment doctrine at the time, which only prohibited physical intrusions
into the private sphere.38 Nevertheless, the Court modified the doctrine to fit
new realities, recognizing that the difference between physical and electronic
intrusion had “no constitutional significance.”39 The Court held that the
Fourth Amendment protects “people, not places”40 and emphasized that
notions of privacy and improper intrusion cannot be defeated by technological
end-runs around previous doctrine.41
The Court’s concern about limiting police discretion, police abuse, and the
extent to which we become a surveillance state has also been expressed in its
cases distinguishing sense-enhancing from sense-creating technologies. Under
this line of reasoning, the Court has required a warrant for technologies that do
not enhance human senses but operate independently of humans. While the
sense enhancement/sense creation doctrine provides some direction to lower
courts, reliance on the doctrine is problematic in light of the difficulty in
knowing when sense enhancement has crossed the line into sense creation. At
other times, the Court has confused the issue by reverting to language
reminiscent of the pre-Katz, private space/public space distinction. We submit,
however, that none of the cases turn on either of these distinctions. The
Court’s decisions are instead animated by the abuse potential of each
surveillance technology.
For example, in United States v. Lee,42 the Court confirmed that no search
took place where officers used “searchlights” or “marine glass or field glass” to
help them see on the deck of a ship at night.43 This limited form of sense
enhancement did not implicate protections against police abuse any more than
what an individual officer watching without binoculars would have done. In
contrast, in Walter v. United States,44 the Court held that using a movie
projector—fairly basic technology, even at the time—to view films without a
warrant was an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment. In Walter,
the government argued that agents did not need a warrant to view the films

38.
39.
40.
41.

42.
43.
44.

See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928).
Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
Id. at 351.
See id. at 362 (Harlan, J., concurring). The protections of the Fourth Amendment go beyond
the walls of each man’s “castle.” See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969)
(noting that the Founders also “protect[ed] Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their
emotions and their sensations” (quoting Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting))).
274 U.S. 559 (1927).
Id. at 563.
447 U.S. 649 (1980).
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because they were lawfully in possession of the materials. The Court rejected
that argument, pointing out the potential for abuse if agents could open sealed
letters that were lawfully in the Postal Service’s possession.45 Underlying the
Court’s decision was a desire to provide constitutional protection to unpopular
messages.46
The Court’s decision in Knotts, which upheld the limited use of beepers
without a warrant, purports to rest on the sense enhancement/sense creation
distinction.47 Referencing the searchlights and marine and field glass at issue in
Lee, the Court explained that “[n]othing in the Fourth Amendment prohibited
the police from augmenting the sensory faculties bestowed upon them at birth
with such enhancement as science and technology afforded them in this
case.”48 Yet the language of “sense enhancement” here is mystifying: it is not at
all clear what “sense” the beepers “enhanced.” Unlike searchlights or
binoculars, the beepers in Knotts did not merely make it easier for the officers
to “see.” Indeed, the Court recognized that, but for the beepers, the police
would have been unable to ascertain the suspect’s location.49 It seems therefore
that the rationale underlying Knotts was not the sense enhancement/sense
creation distinction, but rather the view of the Court that primitive beeper
technology was not susceptible to abuse. After all, the Knotts Court specifically
reserved the question of technology giving broader surveillance powers and
declined to predict the outcome of a case in which technology allowed for
“dragnet-type law enforcement.”50 United States v. Karo,51 decided one year
later, makes clear the limitations of the Knotts decision. The Court held that a
warrant was required for monitoring and downloading beeper data when the
beeper allowed surveillance of areas that officers would not otherwise have
been able to view.52

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

50.

51.
52.

186

Id. at 655.
See id.
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
Id. at 282.
Id. at 285 (“Admittedly, because of the failure of the visual surveillance, the beeper enabled
the law enforcement officials in this case to ascertain the ultimate resting place of the
chloroform when they would not have been able to do so had they relied solely on their
naked eyes.”).
Id. at 283-84; see also United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 556 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“[T]he
[Knotts] Court specifically reserved the question whether a warrant would be required in a
case involving ‘twenty-four hour surveillance’ . . . .” (quoting Knotts, 460 U.S. at 283)), cert.
granted sub nom. United States v. Jones, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (2011) (No. 10-1259).
468 U.S. 705 (1984).
Id. at 714.
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The Court’s most recent discussion of these issues in Kyllo v. United States,
which examined the application of the warrant rule to the use of thermal
imaging technology, highlights how the Justices consider the abuse potential of
a surveillance technology.53 The Court began by recognizing that it had
“previously reserved judgment as to how much technological enhancement of
ordinary perception . . . , if any, is too much.”54 Even while recognizing the
thermal imaging technology at issue to be “relatively crude,” the Court in Kyllo
advocated adopting a rule that would “take account of more sophisticated
systems that are already in use or in development.”55 At some point, the Court
warned, technology might advance to the point where law enforcement could
see through walls.56 Thus, even with the crude technology at issue in Kyllo, the
potential for abuse was vast. In rejecting the government’s argument that only
“intimate details” should be protected, the Court pointed out that the device
might be able to reveal at what hour the lady of the house takes her nightly
bath.57 Advanced forms of the technology—used without a warrant—would
almost certainly “shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy.”58 While the Court
was nominally protecting the “sanctity of the home,”59 the underlying rationale
for Kyllo—as with the other surveillance cases—is the need to protect against
police abuse. Thus the Court’s decision about whether a warrant is required
turns on its structural concern about the potential for abuse.
C. The Ninth Circuit’s Error
The true distinction between Kyllo (warrant required) and Knotts (warrant
not required), expressed subtly by the Court, eluded the Ninth Circuit. That
court suggested that the thermal imaging technology in Kyllo triggered the
Fourth Amendment because thermal imaging gathered information that
otherwise would have been obtained only by “a search unequivocally within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment,”60—i.e., a search of the home.
However, that logic is flawed. The officers in Kyllo could have discovered the

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

533 U.S. 27 (2001).
Id. at 33.
Id. at 36.
Id. at 36 n.3.
Id. at 38.
Id. at 34.
Id.
Pineda-Moreno I, 591 F.3d 1212, 1216 (9th Cir.), reh’g en banc denied, 617 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir.
2010).
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evidence by looking into the home from the outside with binoculars, and such
surveillance would have been allowable without a warrant.61 The relevant
distinction in Kyllo therefore must not be between evidence discovered indoors
or outdoors but rather must be the Court’s discomfort with the use of a
technology that showed vast abuse potential. With such superhero X-ray
vision, walls were no longer a barrier against governmental surveillance. The
Fourth Amendment’s Framers assumed certain physical “checks and balances”
on governmental monitoring—e.g., that walls would not be transparent and
that one officer would not be able to tail two different suspects in two different
locations at one single moment. Where technological change has broken down
these limitations, the Court has sought to restore them. This is the
fundamental distinction between Knotts on the one hand and Kyllo, Katz, and
Walter on the other. The Ninth Circuit ignored this important distinction and
relied on Knotts,62 despite the government’s “limited use” of signals from the
beeper.63
In reaching its decision, the Ninth Circuit wrote off the Supreme Court’s
concern about the potential for mass surveillance. According to Judge
O’Scannlain, quoting the Seventh Circuit: “[s]hould [the] government
someday decide to institute programs of mass surveillance of vehicular
movements, it will be time enough to decide whether the Fourth Amendment
should be interpreted to treat such surveillance as a search.”64 It is important to
note, though, that there is nothing in the Ninth Circuit’s decision that would
prevent “mass” surveillance. Imagine that law enforcement officials were
engaged in mass surveillance of, for example, every person with a Latino
surname who purchases fertilizer. One would need to adopt an extraordinarily
impoverished view of the Fourth Amendment in order to consider this
constitutionally permissible. But under the Ninth Circuit’s decision in PinedaMoreno, law enforcement officials “conducted no search, and Pineda-Moreno

61.

62.
63.

64.
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The Kyllo Court rejected as “quite irrelevant” the dissent’s objection that heat emanating
from the home can sometimes be perceived by observers without the use of technology.
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 35 n.2; see also id. (“The fact that equivalent information could sometimes
be obtained by other means does not make lawful the use of means that violate the Fourth
Amendment.”).
Pineda-Moreno I, 591 F.3d at 1216.
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 284 (1983); id. at 284-85 (holding that the beeper
signal was not received or relied on after the container ended the journey during which it
was tracked by a law enforcement officer); see also Pineda-Moreno II, 617 F.3d 1120, 1124 (9th
Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (contrasting types of
surveillance).
Pineda-Moreno I, 591 F.3d at 1217 n.2 (quoting United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 998
(7th Cir. 2007) (alterations in original)).
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can assert no Fourth Amendment violation,”65 no matter how unreasonable the
“non-search” might have been.
ii. the unique capabilities of gps t echnology
Once the source of the Court’s discomfort with new technologies is
properly identified as a concern about law enforcement abuse, the problem
with GPS surveillance technology becomes somewhat clearer. There is a vast
technical valley between old technologies used by police officers, which merely
assist in tailing suspects, and modern GPS surveillance technology, which
automates tracking and surveillance. The unique capabilities of these
automated systems, which turn over the surveillance function to machines, are
constitutionally significant because they vastly increase the likelihood of abuse.
In this Part, we describe how GPS surveillance technology works and
demonstrate how its technical details create enormous potential for abuse.
A. GPS Surveillance Technology Operates Independently of Humans
Modern GPS surveillance technology is a satellite-based service consisting
of three parts. First, a GPS receiver (the “tracking device”), which is generally
minuscule and inexpensive, autonomously calculates latitude, longitude,
altitude, direction, and speed by receiving and processing location information
from the transmissions of at least four GPS satellites in nearby orbit. The
average case location capabilities specified in the current (2008) GPS standard
call for better than nine meters horizontal accuracy and better than fifteen
meters vertical accuracy.66 The Nationwide Differential GPS (NDGPS) system
enhancement enables an average location accuracy of one to three meters for
compatible receivers and provides coverage over approximately ninety-two
percent of the contiguous forty-eight states.67 Further improvement efforts

65.
66.

67.

Id. at 1215.
U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM STANDARD POSITIONING SERVICE
PERFORMANCE STANDARD 34 (4th ed. 2008), available at http://www.pnt.gov/public/docs/
2008/spsps2008.pdf.
ARINC INC., NDGPS ASSESSMENT FINAL REPORT, at ES-8 (2008), available at http://
www.navcen.uscg.gov/pdf/ndgps/ndgps%20assessment%20report_final.pdf (noting that
“NDGPS provides 1 to 3 meter horizontal accuracy (at 95% confidence) or better” and that
the “NDGPS service is free and available to anyone with an NDGPS receiver”); Research &
Innovative Tech. Admin., Report to Congress: Recapitalization Plan for the Nationwide
Differential Global Positioning System (NDGPS), U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP. (June 2010), available
at http://ntl.bts.gov/lib/34000/34800/34831/NDGPS_Report_to_Congress_--_FINAL_as
_Signed_072010.pdf (explaining that terrestrial NDGPS in the United States is operated by
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underway seek to achieve within ten centimeters horizontal accuracy and
twenty centimeters vertical accuracy.68 Second, a wireless transmitter attached
to the tracking device sends the calculated location information to a specified
remote destination. Finally, a law enforcement computer records the
transmitted tracking data, stores it for an unlimited amount of time, and
compares it with data collected from other targets.69 The first item comprises
the “core” location-determining technology used in GPS surveillance; the
second and third items are technologies to collect and process that location
information for law enforcement use. Alternate methods of retrieving this
information exist. Some GPS tracking devices can store the information
internally. Officers can then manually retrieve the data, or they can do so
remotely—by triggering short-duration (or “burst”) wireless transmissions—
when they are within the device’s range.70
Accordingly, electronic systems such as beeper devices used in the 1980s are
simple tools when compared with modern GPS surveillance technology. As
described by the Supreme Court in Knotts, “[a] beeper is a radio transmitter,
usually battery operated, which emits periodic signals that can be picked up by
a radio receiver.”71 After receiving the signal, the strength of which indicates
whether the object to which the beeper is attached is approaching or moving
away, police officers in the vicinity could use this information to respond
accordingly.72 Beepers could neither determine the location themselves nor
store that data.73 The beepers in Knotts are thus not at all analogous to GPS
technology.

68.

69.

the U.S. Coast Guard under a 1999 Memorandum of Agreement with the U.S. Department
of Transportation and also that “the combined 87 sites provide 92 percent of the contiguous
48 states with single signal coverage”).
ARINC INC., supra note 67, at ES-3 (explaining that “[t]he High Accuracy NDGPS (HANDGPS) program will provide the capability to broadcast GPS observables and other data
to enable the user to achieve better than 10 centimeter horizontal and 20 centimeter vertical
accuracy (at 95% confidence) throughout the coverage area”).
See Hutchins, supra note 15, at 458. See generally Frequently Asked Questions, GPS.GOV,
http://www.gps.gov/support/faq (last updated June 6, 2011) (explaining the benefits of
GPS technology).

70.

For an example of a commercially manufactured burst transmission-enabled GPS unit
designed for use in search-and-rescue and combat operations, see Multi Function Personal
Locator Beacons PLUS Embedded GPS: Series 500-27-07, HR SMITH GRP. OF COS.
http://www.hr-smith.com/images/stories/500-27-07.pdf (last visited Oct. 11, 2011).

71.

United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 277 (1983).
Id.

72.
73.
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Pineda-Moreno II, 617 F.3d 1120, 1124 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting from denial
of rehearing en banc) (“If no one was close enough to pick up the signal, [the data] was lost
forever.”).
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B. The Potential for Abuse
Two aspects of GPS surveillance technology make it prone to abuse. First,
once the GPS tracking device is installed, it can operate autonomously over a
prolonged period of time without human involvement, independently
determining and remotely transmitting positional data twenty-four hours a
day. Unlike the beepers in Knotts, police officers need not tail the GPS tracking
device in order to determine location information. As Chief Judge Kozinski
explains in his dissent from the denial of rehearing Pineda-Moreno en banc:
Beepers could help police keep vehicles in view when following them,
or find them when they lost sight of them, but they still required at
least one officer—and usually many more—to follow the suspect. The
modern devices used in Pineda-Moreno’s case can record the car’s
movements without human intervention.74
The requirement that law enforcement officers actively maintain proximity to
the surveillance device—a notable limitation of “beeper” and other similar
transponder-based location systems—is simply not present when using GPS
technology. In this way, GPS technology eliminates the constraint placed on
police surveillance capabilities by the limited number of officers available at any
given time to track the public’s movements. In the past, it was simply
impossible for the police to assign an officer to track large groups of citizens
around the clock. This new technology thus advances the government’s
surveillance capabilities and “shrink[s] the realm of guaranteed privacy.”75 By
far exceeding the human capacity for surveillance, these machines create the
potential for surveillance of particular individuals, unpopular groups, and
eventually the entire populace. This surveillance could remain entirely
undetected.
Second, the electronic storage of gathered location data allows the data to
be stored forever and considered at any time in the future alongside data
collected from other citizens. In contrast to beeper data, which are lost forever
unless an individual records and stores the information, GPS-associated
computers can by themselves compare data gathered from different individuals

74.
75.

Id.
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).
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and identify common patterns of behavior and gatherings of groups of
people.76 As Chief Judge Kozinski commented:
By tracking and recording the movements of millions of individuals the
government can use computers to detect patterns and develop
suspicions. It can also learn a great deal about us because where we go
says much about who we are . . . . Were Jones, Aaronson and
Rutherford at that protest outside the White House?77
GPS technology is capable of retaining information for an unlimited amount of
time, making targets of tracking vulnerable to intrusive data analysis of where
they went and who they saw for years after the fact.
C. Evidence of Use, Suggestions of Abuse
The precise scope of GPS surveillance is unknown; there are no nationwide
statistics available on the frequency of GPS surveillance, and most police
departments resist disclosing how often they use it. However, the Federal Law
Enforcement Training Center has issued a special bulletin advising officers in
the use of GPS technology,78 and some local jurisdictions have willingly
reported the scope of their use.79 For example, one police department in
Fairfax, Virginia reported using GPS surveillance sixty-one times in 2005
alone.80 The ACLU and its affiliates recently filed 379 public records requests
in thirty-one states to determine the scope of GPS surveillance more precisely.81
As we await responses to those requests, accounts of GPS surveillance are

76.

77.
78.

79.

80.

81.

192

Cf. Pineda-Moreno II, 617 F.3d at 1124 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en
banc) (distinguishing GPS systems from beeper systems on the basis that without human
involvement beeper data was “lost forever”).
Id. at 1125.
See Keith Hodges, Tracking “Bad Guys”: Legal Considerations in Using GPS, FBI
L. ENFORCEMENT BULL. (Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Washingon, D.C.), July 2007, at 25,
available at http://www.fletc.gov/training/programs/legal-division/downloads-articles-and
-faqs/articles/FBI-LE-Bulletin-GPS-Tracking-Jul2007.pdf.
See Ben Hubbard, Police Turn to Secret Weapon: GPS Device, WASH. POST,
Aug. 13, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/08/12/
AR2008081203275.html.
Id.; see also Foltz v. Commonwealth, 698 S.E.2d 281, 284 n.3 (Va. Ct. App. 2010) (discussing
evidence of the frequency of use by local law enforcement in a challenge to GPS
surveillance).
See Allie Bohm, Your Cell Phone Knows Where You Were Last Night . . . Who Else Does?,
ACLU: BLOG RTS. (Aug. 3, 2011, 12:36 PM), http://www.aclu.org/blog/protecting-civil
-liberties-digital-age/your-cell-phone-knows-where-you-were-last-night-who-else.
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necessarily anecdotal. The president of the National Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers, for instance, reports that GPS surveillance has been used “in
cases from New York City to small towns—whoever can afford to get the
equipment and plant it on a car.”82
In one recent incident, a twenty-year-old college student from Santa Clara,
California, Yasir Afifi, discovered a GPS surveillance device affixed to his car.
Afifi is an American citizen whose father, also an American citizen, was
president of a Muslim community association in the United States before
moving to Egypt in 2003. Forty-eight hours after Afifi removed the device and
asked for help online to identify it, he received a visit from several FBI agents
who demanded the return of the device. Afifi was then questioned about an
online blog maintained by his close friend. To date, he has not been charged
with a crime. The FBI, after reclaiming the tracking device, has provided no
further details.83
The anecdotal evidence presented here—the Fairfax data, the FBI bulletin,
the Afifi case, and so on—fall well short of the “mass, suspicionless
surveillance” that the Solicitor General says might trigger a warrant
requirement.84 Yet it is worth reflecting for a moment on what circumstances
might trigger such “mass, suspicionless surveillance”—e.g., a terrorist attack by
enemies (either foreign or domestic) whose ethnicity, religious affiliation,
political persuasion, or other characteristics catalyze fear of or animus toward a
particular minority group. It seems strange to say that under those
circumstances, courts would shift from the no-warrant default rule to a
heightened standard of Fourth Amendment protection. After all, civil liberties
in times of emergency are subject to a one-way ratchet, and the direction is
down.85 The rules we set now, in “normal” times, ten years after the last attack
on U.S. soil, serve as a ceiling, not a floor. The Solicitor General’s claim that
the warrant question “can await resolution” until we see an uptick in use of
GPS surveillance ignores the political economy of emergency.86

82.
83.

84.
85.
86.

Hubbard, supra note 79.
See Kim Zetter, Caught Spying on Student, FBI Demands GPS Tracker Back, WIRED, Oct. 7,
2010, http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/10/fbi-tracking-device/all/1. Afifi recently
filed a civil suit seeking damages for the intrusiveness of the GPS surveillance. Press Release,
Council on American-Islamic Relations, FBI Sued for Warrantless GPS
Surveillance of Calif. Muslim (Mar. 2, 2011), http://www.cair.com/ArticleDetails.aspx
?mid1=777&&ArticleID=26745.
See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
See Geoffrey R. Stone, Civil Liberties in Wartime, 28 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 215, 215 (2003).
David Steinberg has argued that “the regulation of powerful new search techniques should
come from statutes written by elected legislators.” David E. Steinberg, Sense-Enhanced
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iii. gps surveillance, dignity interests, and core
constitutional rights
So far, the analysis in this Essay has not yet tackled the Supreme Court’s
“expectation of privacy” standard, which complicates—but ultimately
strengthens—our argument. As then-Justice Rehnquist recognized in Knotts,
“th[e] Court uniformly has held that the application of the Fourth Amendment
depends on whether the person invoking its protection can claim a justifiable, a
reasonable, or a legitimate expectation of privacy that has been invaded by
government action.”87 In Pineda-Moreno, the Ninth Circuit relied on Knotts to
hold that the government can use GPS surveillance technology without
warrants because individuals have no reasonable expectation of privacy in their
movements through public space.88 But individuals do have a “reasonable
expectation” that they are not being watched (at least not constantly), and that
expectation is threatened by GPS surveillance, regardless of whether the
expectation attaches to any particular fact on its own.
Moreover, and more importantly, a robust Fourth Amendment cannot
depend on whether individuals expect that particular facts will be kept private.
If that were the case, then in a scenario in which the government ignored
privacy rights on a vast scale—as in George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four,89
Terry Gilliam’s 1985 movie Brazil,90 or the contemporary children’s book The
Hunger Games91—there would be no expectation of privacy at all. The Ninth
Circuit’s interpretation of the “expectation of privacy” criterion creates the
paradoxical situation in which law enforcement overreach is legitimized once it
becomes routinized. Surely, the Fourth Amendment is robust enough that it
would not lose its force if members of the public came to think that “Big
Brother” behavior on the part of police officers was par for the course.

87.
88.

89.

90.
91.
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Searches and the Irrelevance of the Fourth Amendment, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 465, 467
(2007). The institutional questions implicated by that claim lie beyond the scope of this
Essay; the Supreme Court, for its part, has not been willing to cede this territory to the
political branches. See supra Section I.A.
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 280 (1983) (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735,
740 (1979)).
Pineda-Moreno I, 591 F.3d 1212, 1216-17 (9th Cir.), reh’g en banc denied, 617 F.3d 1120 (9th
Cir. 2010); see also Orin Kerr, GPS Surveillance, supra note 18 (applying Knotts to reach the
conclusion that warrants are not required).
GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR (1949). While the world of Orwell’s Nineteen
Eighty-Four may be our most culturally recognizable icon of totalitarianism and as such is an
overused reference point, it is no less illustrative.
BRAZIL (Embassy International Pictures 1985).
SUZANNE COLLINS, THE HUNGER GAMES (2008).
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To be tenable, the “expectation of privacy” requirement must protect
something more than our predictions whether a particular fact or act will lie
outside the state’s line of sight. The D.C. Circuit’s analysis in Maynard seemed
to grasp this need. The circuit court concluded that prolonged GPS surveillance
allows the government to develop an overall picture of people’s lives that goes
far beyond what individuals expect others to know about their actions.92 Our
E-ZPass account records and airline reservations might reveal our comings and
goings in broad brushstrokes, but GPS surveillance allows the government to
see our microlevel movements: what house of worship we attend, and how
often; whether we see a psychiatrist; with whom we spend the night; where we
eat; where we exercise; and whether we attend a particular political
organization’s meetings. That this information might be discoverable through
credit card records or other sources is no answer: when news broke that the
FBI had accessed credit c a r d records without a warrant, the Justice
Department’s Inspector General called the actions “serious misconduct.”93 By
contrast, the Justice Department does not apologize for warrantless GPS
surveillance; rather, it unabashedly defends the practice.
The following sections elaborate two interpretations of “expectation of
privacy”: one in which the expectation attaches to specific facts and acts and is
dependent on the context of actions and behavior, and another in which the
expectation protects a less clearly delineated sphere of personal and communal
life. We contend that both understandings support Fourth Amendment
protection in the GPS context, though only the latter addresses the argument,
mentioned above, that a prediction-based privacy right will paradoxically grow
weaker as government intrusions into the private sphere grow more severe.
A. Expectation Depends on Context
Taking seriously the Supreme Court’s mandate that we must not allow new
technology to “shrink the private realm” requires us to examine the impact that
the means of surveillance, the nature of the technology at issue, and its

92.

United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“Prolonged surveillance
reveals types of information not revealed by short-term surveillance, such as what a person
does repeatedly, what he does not do, and what he does ensemble.”), cert. granted sub nom.
United States v. Jones, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (2011) (No. 10-1259).

93.

Ken Dilanian, FBI Involved in Hundreds of Violations in National Security Investigations, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 30, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jan/30/nation/la-na-fbi-violations
-20110130.
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potential for abuse will have on our privacy expectations.94 Where technology
changes what is visible and knowable about us, we cannot afford to revive the
rejected Fourth Amendment doctrine that attempted to draw a strict line
between public and private space based on notions of physical trespass.
As the D.C. Circuit concluded, GPS surveillance invades a reasonable
expectation of privacy because prolonged surveillance from the sky allows the
government to develop an overall picture of people’s lives that goes far beyond
what individuals expect others to know about their public actions.95
Specifically, it is the prolonged nature of the surveillance that creates the
problem. Prolonged use of GPS surveillance technology allows the collection of
a more detailed view of a person’s life and activities than that gained by short
bursts of tracking,96 both because the duration of the tracking allows the
collection of more information and because GPS technology collects an
unprecedented amount of detail on its target’s movements.97 This approach to
evaluating whether an invasion of privacy has occurred, described by the D.C.
Circuit as recognizing that “the whole is something different than the sum of
its parts,”98 is not novel.99 Instead, it is a straightforward application of the
rule that whether a law enforcement search is “reasonable” is a fact-specific
inquiry that must be determined through review of “the totality of the

94.

95.
96.

97.
98.
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Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37-39 (2001); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 606-07
(1977) (Brennan, J., concurring) (asserting that the Fourth Amendment limits not only “the
type of information the State may gather,” but also “the means it may use to gather it”);
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) (“The overriding function of the Fourth
Amendment is to protect personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the
State.”).
Maynard, 615 F.3d at 562.
Id. at 557 (“According to the [Supreme] Court, its decision [in Knotts] should not be read to
sanction ‘twenty-four hour surveillance of any citizen of this country.’” (quoting United
States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 284 (1983))).
See supra Part II.
Maynard, 615 F.3d at 561 n.4 (quoting KURT KOFFKA, PRINCIPLES OF GESTALT PSYCHOLOGY
176 (1935)); id. at 558 (explaining that the whole of one’s movements over the course of a
month “reveals more—sometimes a great deal more—than does the sum of its parts”).
See id. at 562 (“What may seem trivial to the uninformed, may appear of great moment to
one who has a broad view of the scene.” (quoting CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 178 (1985))).
Orin Kerr has called the Maynard court’s analysis a “mosaic theory.” Orin Kerr, D.C.
Circuit Introduces “Mosaic Theory” of Fourth Amendment, Holds GPS Monitoring a Fourth
Amendment Search, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Aug. 6, 2010, 2:46 PM), http://volokh.com/2010/
08/06/d-c-circuit-introduces-mosaic-theory-of-fourth-amendment-holds-gps-monitoring
-a-fourth-amendment-search. Kerr’s assessment trivializes the detailed factual analysis of
privacy interests required under the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence and is a misnomer in
any case.
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circumstances.”100 Indeed, this type of analysis—rather than reliance on public
versus private space—is required by Katz, where the Court held that “what [a
person] seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public,
may be constitutionally protected.”101
As Helen Nissenbaum points out, where behavior occurs is not always
determinative of the private nature of that behavior; instead, “norms of
appropriateness dictate what information about persons is appropriate, or
fitting, to reveal in a particular context.”102 She argues:
[W]hether a particular action is determined a violation of privacy is a
function of several variables, including the nature of the situation, or
context; the nature of the information in relation to that context; the
roles of agents receiving information; their relationships to information
subjects; on what terms the information is shared by the subject; and
the terms of further dissemination.103
The Supreme Court has followed this logical approach to determining privacy
expectations in another context. For example, in Ferguson v. City of Charleston,
the Court recognized that there is a difference between handing over one’s
bodily fluids for drug testing in a medical context and handing over one’s
bodily fluids outside a medical context.104 Because “[t]he reasonable
expectation of privacy enjoyed by the typical patient undergoing diagnostic
tests in a hospital is that the results of those tests will not be shared with
nonmedical personnel without her consent,”105 the plaintiffs in that case had an
expectation of privacy in the results of drug tests of fluids they shared with
medical personnel. The expectation of privacy differs based on who was given
the fluids and in what context.106

100.
101.
102.

103.
104.
105.
106.

See, e.g., Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996).
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967); see also Susan W. Brenner, The Fourth
Amendment in an Era of Ubiquitous Technology, 75 MISS. L.J. 1, 26-27 (2005).
Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. L. REV. 119, 138 (2004); see also
Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1087, 1145 (2002) (“[P]rivacy
must be valued contextually.”).
Nissenbaum, supra note 102, at 155.
531 U.S. 67 (2001).
Id. at 78.
Similarly, in Ohio v. Robinette, the Supreme Court rejected a bright-line rule for determining
the voluntariness of consent to a search and thus the reasonableness of the search in favor of
a “traditional contextual approach.” 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996) (quoting Michigan v.
Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573 (1988)).
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Similarly, context determines whether we expect privacy while driving on
public highways—or in any public setting. As Nissenbaum argues, “[t]he
notion that when individuals venture out in public . . . ‘anything goes,’ is pure
fiction. . . . [E]ven in the most public of places, it is not out of order for people
to respond in word or thought, ‘none of your business,’ to a stranger asking
their names.”107 Michael Froomkin points out that “at least in large cities, one
enjoys the illusion, and to a large extent the reality, of being able to move about
with anonymity.”108 In fact, the conception of privacy as a form of total secrecy
is ill-suited to the digital information age: “[t]he people we call, the papers we
discard, and our financial records are commonly understood as private matters
even though third-parties may have access to (or even possess) that
information.”109 Ultimately, “clinging to the notion of privacy as total secrecy
would mean the practical extinction of privacy in today’s world.”110
Additionally, the public’s behavior toward encroaching forms of surveillance
is relevant to whether courts can infer that the public believes certain actions
are private. On this count, the American public has clearly rejected the notion
that the government should be able to follow us without our consent. Although
many Americans are comfortable with using a GPS service to determine their
own personal location when that service operates subject to their consent and
control,111 Americans are uncomfortable with GPS surveillance technology
when there is even a slight loss of user control.112 For example, despite a strong
push by companies encouraging Americans to adopt “geosocial” software that
would allow users to broadcast their locations to selected friends using GPS in

107.
108.
109.
110.
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Nissenbaum, supra note 102, at 139; see also id. at 143 (arguing that “a privacy violation has
occurred when . . . contextual norms of appropriateness . . . have been breached”).
A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1461, 1476 (2000).
Solove, supra note 102, at 1152.
Id.
Subscription services such as OnStar can access an automobile’s location and even transmit
this location in case of emergency or theft, but only with the consent of the user. See, e.g.,
OnStar Privacy Statement, ONSTAR, http://www.onstar.com/web/fmv/privacy (last updated
Jan. 1, 2011).
GPS technology is also used by some private and government employers to ensure job
performance and service delivery, but this use is limited to the terms of the employment
relationship and happens only while the employee is on the job using a vehicle owned by the
employer. See, e.g., Judy Muller, City Monitors Employees with GPS, ABC NEWS, Feb. 21
2004, http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/story?id=129219 (explaining that city governments use
GPS tracking systems to ensure efficiency and monitor services such as street sweeping and
pothole fixing); On Your Tracks: GPS Tracking in the Workplace, NAT’L WORKRIGHTS INST.
10 (n.d.), http://workrights.us/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/NWI_GPS_Report.pdf.
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their phones, only four percent of online adult Americans use these services.113
For those skeptical whether there can be any plausible privacy expectation for
these public actions, as Chief Judge Kozinski noted, “[y]ou can preserve your
anonymity from prying eyes, even in public, by traveling at night, through
heavy traffic, in crowds, by using a circuitous route, disguising your
appearance, passing in and out of buildings and being careful not to be
followed.”114 As the Maynard court observed, we have not become a society that
expects this monitoring of our daily activities, and there is no sign that we
would accept that type of oversight.115
Indeed, even the federal government recognizes that members of the
American public do not expect to disclose data about their movements from
place to place throughout the day. To recruit volunteers whose vehicles would
be equipped with GPS devices for a federally funded study to assess a new
mileage-based tax, study organizers felt it necessary to assure volunteers that
“[n]o detailed route information regarding your driving will be stored or
collected”116 and that information about mileage would be maintained in
“highly secure locations” in a separate database on a separate server from their
personal information.117 The organizers’ assurances indicate their recognition
of a reasonable expectation of privacy in data about public movements.
B. Privacy as Self-Definition and Dignity
When our activities and our patterns of behavior are exposed to view, our
sphere of self shrinks accordingly. The expectation that these “private” matters
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will be known to others has the potential to change our behavior and
ultimately who we are. These expected intrusions inflict upon us a different
identity; they force a schism between true identity and expressed identity. In
constitutional parlance, they chill the exercise of constitutionally protected
activity—speech, thoughts, and behaviors—especially those that involve
criticisms of the existing government or that are seen as odious by government
officials.118 The “expectation of privacy” standard has always been used to help
us identify the aspects of life that are vital to our sense of well-being, aspects
that have been referred to in the past as interests in privacy and now are
sometimes talked about as aspects of “dignity” or interests in self-definition.119
Expectations of privacy also play an essential role in civic and democratic life.
As the Court has recognized, there is a “vital relationship between freedom to
associate and privacy in one’s associations. . . . Inviolability of privacy in group
association may in many circumstances be indispensable to preservation of
freedom of association, particularly where a group espouses dissident
beliefs.”120 With such deep personal values at stake, the “expectation of
privacy” ought to be conceived of as what the individual believes to be crucial
to his or her sense of self.
One might naturally ask why a warrant requirement changes the landscape
so dramatically: after all, we would still never know for sure whether we were
the subject of surveillance by the government. And yet the requirement that
law enforcement officials justify their surveillance decisions to judges ensures
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that the “machines” are watching only with good reason, not based on a whim,
prejudice, or desire to discover disliked behavior. As such, it prevents the
schism of self that threatens our dignitary interests.
Professor Kerr has objected that a rule requiring judges to sign off on GPS
surveillance will lead to judicial confusion and inconsistency.121 Bu t this
concern is a red herring. Simply requiring law enforcement officials to ask for a
warrant imposes a limit on the expansion rate of the scope of surveillance.
There may indeed be tough decisions for courts to make about whether limited
use of GPS surveillance (e.g., tracking a suspect for a single day) triggers the
Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. But this is why we have judges, and
they will use all the criteria they apply to other surveillance situations—
including the practical considerations about the ability to obtain a warrant—
here. Even if judges grant warrants for GPS surveillance liberally, the
requirement that law enforcement authorities justify each use of GPS
surveillance prevents them from multiplying this monitoring by millions.
conclusion
When used properly, advanced surveillance technologies significantly
enhance the ability of law enforcement to maintain order and public safety.
However, the Ninth Circuit’s strained, mechanical application of Knotts and
the proposed bright-line rule between behavior indoors and behavior outdoors
leaves fundamental interests protected by the Fourth Amendment unguarded.
Without a warrant requirement to guide its use and constrain its growth, the
potential for abuse of GPS surveillance technology is vast, and its use will
significantly “shrink the realm of guaranteed personal privacy.”122 Moreover, it
will upset the system of checks and balances—physical as well as legal—that
the Framers expected would apply to future generations. The Jones case affords
the Supreme Court an opportunity to step in and clarify that, as with any new
technologies that allow machines to do the watching, GPS surveillance
technology can only be used for prolonged, automated surveillance on the
authority of a warrant. Such clarification may go a long way toward resolving
the confusion that the Court’s prior Fourth Amendment case law has wrought.
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